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Counterfactual definiteness is shown from analysis of Bell’s Theorem to be the factor separating
classical from quantum theories. From this, it is shown that, by replacing it with ‘counterfactual
semi-definiteness’, the definiteness of possible options available after a measurement event, some apt
analysis of possible states can be kept. While not as solid as that forbidden by the EPR paradox and
Bell’s Theorem, it allows us to start investigating the physical implementation of possible states in
a way that has rarely been done. Working from this, the idea of counterfactuality, and interaction
between counterfactual possibilities, is developed further.
INTRODUCTION
Counterfactual definiteness is the commonsensical idea
that, were something to be done a different way, it is
meaningful to talk about there being one ’definite’ way
in which the world would change. It forms a key part
of our day-to-day life, to imagine that if there were a
small change, the universe would be affected in a small,
but measurable, and ultimately deterministic way, as ul-
timately that means that if everything were repeated in
exactly the same way, the world would run as it has.
However, since the advent of quantum mechanics, this
has come under doubt. The inherently probabilistic na-
ture of quantum collapse removes the security of the idea
that, were you to repeat an experiment in exactly the
same way, you would get the same result.
In this paper, we will investigate the arguments put
forward that the only way to make sense of a quantum
universe is to remove counterfactual definiteness, before
then looking at just how strong this exclusion needs be.
This will be done by evaluation of the necessity of the loss
of counterfactual definiteness to various interpretations
of quantum mechanics, and the credibility and usability
of the resulting interpretation. Through this, we hope
that at least something of our notion of common sense
may be preserved when dealing with the quantum world,
and that a more useful tool for dealing with apparent
counterfactual definiteness may be sourced.
EPR AND BELL’S THEOREM
The EPR Paradox
EPR and Uncertainty
Einstein made use of the notion of conjugate quan-
tities, for which the uncertainty in one must increase as
that in the other decreases [1]. Between this concept, and
that fact that quantum mechanics allows the states of two
particles to become correlated in such a way as they can-
not be rendered independent of one another (the state
cannot be written as a tensor product of two or more
other states), Einstein came to a paradox - that by mea-
suring one of a set of conjugate variables of one of a pair
of two correlated particles, the conjugate variable for the
correlated particle becomes uncertain.
For example, consider two particles (labelled 1 and
2), each described by their own (non-independent) wave-
function (ψ1 and ψ2). Were we to try and measure the
position, x1, of particle 1, we would apply the position
operator Xˆ to it, allowing us to get an exact position
for it. This would be at the expense of then becoming
uncertain as to what it’s momentum would be, were we
to apply the momentum operator, Pˆ , as the uncertain-
ties of the two are related by the equation ∆x∆p ≥ ~2 .
However, through taking the position of particle 1, we
would also have to become uncertain of the momentum
of particle 2, as otherwise from that we could derive par-
ticle 1’s momentum using the system’s initial conditions.
But, before taking the measure of particle 1’s position,
we could have freely applied the momentum operator to
particle 2, and obtained its momentum. Therefore, in-
stantaneously, without making any direct contact with
it, we are changing particle 2’s state.
To Einstein, this problem, that you could go from
something supposedly definitely existing to being indef-
inite - in his words, this loss of the element of reality
corresponding to the momentum of the second particle
- seemed a nonsense, and showed that, in his mind, the
quantum mechanical treatment of reality was incomplete.
Bohm’s Reformulation
However, the above example somewhat over-convolutes
things by introducing the idea of conjugate variables. In
his 1951 book, Quantum Theory, Bohm provides a sim-
plification, doing away with non-commuting observables
and focusing on the idea of a joint state which cannot be
written as the tensor product of a single state per par-
ticle [2]. Bohm rendered this simplified case of Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen’s argument into an immediately ob-
2vious form by imagining the joint spin state, |ψ〉 of two
electrons in such an ’entangled’ set-up, written in Dirac
notation as
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉 ⊗ |↓〉+ |↓〉 ⊗ |↑〉) (1)
where the first ket applies to the first electron, and so
on. As this joint state cannot be written as a product
state, these two electrons cannot have their spin states
described independently of one another. This means,
when the measurement of one of the electron’s spins col-
lapses that state, it forces the overall state to collapse,
pushing the other electron into its corresponding spin -
both instantaneously and without any direct mechanism.
Not only this, but the initial state into which the first
electron collapses is random. This means there is no way
the second electron can be said to be ’pre-prepared’ into
the corresponding state, to avoid this occurrence being
both instantaneous and mechanism-free. This gets right
to the heart of the paradox Einstein was talking about
when he referred to ’spooky action at a distance’ - in-
formation supposedly passing from one place to another,
instantly, without mechanism.
Compared to what had appeared before, this result
seemed deeply disturbing - gone is the stable, determin-
istic universe of classical physics, with the bounding limit
for data-sending of special relativity. Instead, in its place,
is something probabilistic, non-local, and all together less
palatable than what came before. To reconcile this to the
world around us, something previously assumed impossi-
ble by classical physics and special and general relativity
must be allowed. The first possibility is to remove local-
ity - to assume that, in these quantum cases, an instanta-
neous signal can be sent, and moreover sent without any
visible mechanism, to allow the second particle to align
with the result of the first. This obviously didn’t appeal
to Einstein, given it would mean nature violates Special
Relativity, something previously considered fact. The
second possibility is that in all previous experiments, all
attempts to remove pre-existing correlations have failed,
and that whatever causes the first particle to prefer one
option forces the second into its corresponding state -
the result was never random, but one of two similar-
looking but ultimately superdetermined options. This,
while initially promising, is just either claiming that all
evidence so far for quantum theory is the result of un-
detectably small correlations, which grows less and less
likely as information is gathered, or that we live in a
fully superdetermined universe. The third option is to
bite the metaphorical bullet, and deny that the state of
the particles is counterfactually definite - to say that the
universe is probabilistic, that repeating the measurement
process exactly has no certainty of giving the same result,
and that these simultaneous joint probability states (e.g.
Eq.1) truly exist. While the previous two options violate
physical laws or experimental evidence, this one, while
mathematically more allowable, seems to strike at the
heart of what was viewed to be the rational assumptions
of scientific theory - repeatability, rationality, and deter-
minism.
To that end, Einstein, and later to a lesser degree
Bohm, advocated that, rather than accept any of these
three seemingly nonsensical options, quantum mechan-
ics must be incomplete, and so there must be some local
hidden variable that is governing the quantum phenom-
ena in a way that at the least respects the basic tenets of
our understanding of reality (locality/no superluminality,
counterfactual definiteness, and the fact that all events
can be causally and deterministically traced, rather than
probabilistic). This debate, as to whether quantum the-
ory was incomplete, and a local hidden variable model
could complete it, was the basis of the debate between
Bohr and Einstein - but very little could be said to prove
one side over the other.
Bell’s Theorem
”On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox”
For nearly thirty years, the question of which of these
four possible options you believed remained, broadly, a
point of interpretation - there was no real physical dif-
ference ascribable to either quantum mechanics being an
incomplete local hidden variable theory, or being com-
plete but meaning one of a number of weird conclusions
for the universe. All this changed, however, with the
work of Bell, who showed that, in certain circumstances,
there would be a difference between the predictions re-
sulting from a local-hidden-variable model and a fully
quantum-mechanical model of the world [3].
Specifically, he proposed that there would be a set of
experiments that one could undertake, where there would
be an upper bound on the correlations that you would get
classically (say, if the universe could be fully described
by a local-hidden-variable model), that could be beaten
if the problem was rendered into quantum-informational
form, as would be valid if quantum mechanics provided
a complete picture of reality. This formed the crux of
what was later referred to as Bell’s Theorem - that these
Bell Inequalities, which act as limits when dealing with
situations using a local-hidden-variable model, are both
demonstrable, and can be demonstrably violated when
using quantum mechanics.
CHSH
The most famous of these Bell Inequalities is the CHSH
Inequality [4]. Here, we imagine a source that emits pairs
of particles, each of which goes into a programmable test
3unit. For the left-hand particle, it either is subjected to
test a or a′, and for the right, to test b or b′. All of
these tests have result either +1 or −1 (e.g. tests of spin,
where a and a′ (b and b′) are along different axes). While
the two tests on each side have no requirement to test
orthogonally to each other, the result is most prominent
if they do (e.g. a and b testing spin along the x-axis, and
a′ and b′ along the y-axis).
We then derive the quantum correlations, E(x, y), for
x being one of the tests on the left-hand particle (a or
a′), and y being one of the tests on the right (b or b′).
We do this by taking the four coincidence counts for our
particular choice of x and y (N++, when both detectors
register +1, N−−, when both register −1, N+−, when
the left registers +1 and the right −1, and N−+, when
the left registers −1 and the right +1), and taking
E(x, y) =
(N++ +N−−)− (N+− −N−+)
(N++ +N−−) + (N+− +N−+)
(2)
to get a weighted measure of the quantum correlation of
x and y. From this, we then generate S, where
S = E(a, b)− E(a, b′) + E(a′, b) + E(a′, b′) ≤ 2 (3)
This gives us our Bell Inequality - if a quantum version
of the system can get a value for S of greater than 2,
then we have our test for which of these two forms the
logic of the universe takes. This quantum case we can
compare it to, often referred to as Tsirelson’s Bound [5],
is where we take the sum of the expectation values of the
products of the observables that correspond to the tests
(Aˆ for a, Aˆ′ for a′, etc...) to get
S = 〈AˆBˆ〉+ 〈AˆBˆ′〉+ 〈Aˆ′Bˆ〉 − 〈Aˆ′Bˆ′〉 ≤ 2
√
2 (4)
This shows that, in the quantum case, the Bell Inequality
for the CHSH set-up can be violated - showing that a
local-hidden-variable model fails to account for quantum
correlations between the two particles. This shows that
an experiment which gives us an S-value of greater than
2, as has just been shown to be possible, will prove Bell’s
Theorem, and show that the Universe doesn’t obey a
local-hidden-variable model. As will be seen below, this
has been shown experimentally to be the case.
Experimental Verification
A large body of work has been done to experimentally
test Bell’s Theorem, given the difficulty in closing the
loophole presented by trying to ensure that the appar-
ent quantum correlations which allow the Bell inequality
violation aren’t due to preexisting correlations governing
the choice of test. These experimental attempts started
with work based on CH74, another Bell Inequality also
made by Clauser and Horne [6], and CHSH - of these,
the most notable is that by Aspect et al, which involved
the choice of test photons were subjected to being cho-
sen while they were in flight [7, 8]. Since then, there
have been many more tests, each with ever more inge-
nious ways of reducing the likelihood that the results are
due to loopholes, to the extent that the most significant
recent one, by Hensen et al, effectively closes this loop-
hole of correlation entirely, presenting only that there can
be prior correlation governing the choice of experiment
if superdeterminism is accepted [9, 10]. This effectively
means that, given this proven difference between how any
possible local hidden variable theory would behave, and
how our universe does behave, we can state once and for
all that quantum mechanics isn’t incomplete.
COUNTERFACTUALITY AND DEFINITENESS
The Trilemma Revisited
Given that experimental proofs of Bell’s Theorem ef-
fectively remove the option that Quantum Mechanics is
merely the incomplete form of a local hidden-variable the-
ory, we have to move back to the other three options that
were proposed, to allow a quantum-mechanical descrip-
tion of reality to match the universe. These options are
either that superluminal communication is possible, su-
perdeterminism is in effect in our universe, or there is no
counterfactual definiteness. All of these have problems.
Superluminal Communication
The first option allowing the possibility of Bell Inequal-
ity violation is that, on the collapse of one particle’s state,
it can instantaneously send a message to its partner, al-
lowing it to collapse into the corresponding state. This
is the most physically palatable of the three options, in-
sofar as it respects standard definitions of causality and
definiteness, but it has one major flaw - it violates special
relativity.
According to Special Relativity, the fastest that any
information can propagate through space is at c, the vac-
uum speed of light [11]. This result has been repeatedly
proven experimentally [12–16], and is regarded as a cor-
nerstone of modern physics. Therefore, denying this, by
saying that entanglement is somehow able to uniquely
circumvent this limit and allow a causal change in the
state of one particle simultaneously to that of its causer,
seems implausible - not to mention, given the nature of
Lorentz invariance, effectively identical to saying that the
collapse of the wavefunction of a particle can cause some-
thing to occur which happened before it. Such a viola-
tion would be eminently observable, and would have had
massive implications on the development of our theories
on the nature of light - yet this hasn’t shown up at all,
4despite the massive impact that it would have. This leads
us to conclude that such an ability of quantum systems
to nonlocally communicate must be nonexistent.
Superdeterminsim
The second possibility is that the universe is superde-
termined - that, above and beyond the typical mecha-
nistic determinism caused by universal laws, each and
every event is uniquely and independently caused. In
such a system, each particle ’knows’ in advance which
state it will be in, in a way that requires no regular laws
or rules to determine. While, on the surface, this ap-
proach resolves the issue of the supposed instantaneous,
mechanism-free causation of the collapse of one particle
based on the other (due to it instead having been sep-
arately pre-ordained into which states the particles will
collapse), this approach is both epistemically tricky, and
presents a number of physical issues.
The reason superdeterminism is considered epistemi-
cally difficult is that, given it relies on every single event
having been caused independently and separately from
any other event, it is impossible to establish a causal re-
lationship between any two things - nothing causes, or is
caused by, anything else. This means attempts to fab-
ricate rules as to how certain events cause other events,
such as the entire sum of the laws of physics, are rendered
to nought - there can be no laws governing causal inter-
actions as there are no causal interactions. Admittedly,
such an argument relies on all events being superdeter-
mined, but, given the sheer number of quantum events
that would need to be, this doesn’t seem too much of
a leap. Further, it begs the question what force is pre-
determining these events? While initially popular as a
school of metaphysics with proponents such as Bishop
Berkeley, such ideas of grand superdeterminism by, say,
a supreme being have fallen out of favour with even the
majority of religious philosophers, who view the sheer
sum of evidence based on otherwise coincidental repe-
titions between certain causes and given effects as proof
that causality, in which physical events cause other phys-
ical events, seems far more parsimonious than everything
being caused independently of any other event.
Aside from this more philosophical issue, there is also
the more physical one whereby we have no mechanism by
which such a full predestination could be ’remembered’
by every single object in the universe. Such a chore-
ographing of events would lead to a number of potentially
ludicrous scenarios, such as being able to interrogate the
future of anything in the universe from any other parti-
cle, allowing effective superluminal classical communica-
tion, and rendering meaningless all of the conclusions of
special relativity. This, if anything, renders superdeter-
minism even less palatable than the previous option in
the trilemma, as at least in the latter case, superluminal
communication is restricted only to quantum events.
Counterfactual Definiteness
The final option posited by Einstein is the one about
which he was most critical - the idea that the universe,
at least when dealing with quantum interactions, lacks
counterfactual definiteness. Counterfactual definiteness
is where, if a measurement is repeated with no change in
the conditions present, that the result will be the same.
While the other two forks in the trichotomy grant pos-
sibilities whereby the conditions around a measurement
may be altered without the measurer being able to do
anything about it (either by instantaneous signalling, or
vastly widening the number of them), claiming that the
universe isn’t counterfactually definite removes this prop-
erty entirely - nature goes from being deterministic to
probabilistic.
For what it is worth, it is this idea which Einstein was
most unable to accept, repeatedly asserting God ”does
not throw dice” [17, 18]. However, as per the Born Rule,
this is also a well-accepted element nowadays of Quan-
tum Mechanics, and few serious physicists today would
consider it an argument for the incompleteness of the
theory, as inherently counterintuitive as it is. It does
however, beg the question of just how counterfactually in-
definite quantum theory actually is, given, barring mea-
surement, wavefunction dynamics is regularly described
as being deterministic, insofar as a wavefunction’s time
evolution can be entirely evaluated from its initial condi-
tions. This leads us to wonder, in such a case, just how
counterfactually indefinite quantum theory really is, and
if a weakening of this definition can help it look more
commonsensical to an outside observer.
Interpretations and Definiteness
The easiest way to evaluate the extent to which the
removal of some form of counterfactual definiteness is
needed is to look at the interpretations in which it is
removed. Given quantum mechanics demands the ex-
istence of conjugate variables, and so the ability of a
variable to be indeterminate (to allow its conjugate to
be precisely known), all quantum mechanical interpreta-
tions must permit some element of ’fogginess’ about the
reality of certain variables. How they implement that
fogginess, however, is where they differ.
Copenhagen Interpretation
Originally the standard interpretation, the Copen-
hagen Interpretation directly rejects questions of the sort
5that would define whether the world was or wasn’t coun-
terfactually definite - in such an interpretation, a ques-
tion such as ”what would the spin of an electron be, if it
was measured in the x-direction rather than the y?” are
meaningless. In this almost quietist interpretation, the
theorist is banned from even considering counterfactual
cases, let alone assessing if they possess counterfactual
definiteness. Therefore, this interpretation, alongside the
other minimalist interpretations, the Ensemble and the
Statistical Interpretation, doesn’t contribute much to our
discussion.
Everettian Interpretation
Everett’s Relative State Interpretation, later extended
into the wider-known ’Many-Worlds’ Interpretation,
posits the idea that different possible quantum states
all co-exist - we merely observe one facet of the whole.
This is analogised as a variety of alternate worlds, one
for each quantum state, with the ’collapse’ acting as a
branching point from which they split. Therefore, in this
interpretation, counterfactual definiteness is avoided by
having not one definite counterfactual option, but many
simultaneously-acting possibilities [19].
Bohmian Interpretation
In a Bohmian Interpretation, real particles exist, and
they have a defined position, momentum, and real values
for all other observables, as per classical physics. The
key difference, however, which makes it a valid interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics, is that each particle is sub-
ject to an expressly non-local quantum potential - thus,
the position, and through that according to Bohmian me-
chanics all other observables, are perturbed into precisely
the state that would be expected by quantum mechan-
ics [20]. However, this still leaves the particles with an
objectively-existing value for any required observable (in
Bohm’s theory, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle is a
limit on our ability to know the value of conjugate vari-
ables, rather than an actual uncertainty on their exis-
tence), and so counterfactual definiteness exists - the el-
ement of the trilemma lost here is locality. To that end,
Bohm theory shows potentially a route for the trading
counterfactual definiteness in exchange for a weakening
of one of the other facets - given that Bohm’s non-locality
doesn’t allow faster-than-light signalling, it should pre-
serve special relativity, despite still ostensibly containing
non-local effects [21].
Collapse-Based Interpretations
Collapse-Based Interpretations of quantum mechanics
are fairly broad, but have been grouped together here
as they have one key feature in common. Whether based
on consciousness, or gravity, or some other objective phe-
nomenon, they all involve a process of collapse - at some
point, typically measurement, the wavefunction’s decay
from many states to just one [22]. In such an interpre-
tation, the other states, previously part of the wavefunc-
tion, are lost entirely - there is no definiteness associated
with them, and so counterfactual definiteness doesn’t ex-
ist in this theory. However, these theories also have the
issue that collapse is difficult to observe, and we still have
no idea what mediates it, or any reason for preferring
one possibility over any of the others - showing that just
removing counterfactual definiteness without any addi-
tional loss from one of the other possible options may
not be as useful as thought for producing a valid inter-
pretation of quantum theory.
Weakened Definiteness
Given what has been gleaned from looking at other
interpretations, we can move on to looking at what is
necessary for, and what can be excluded from, our inter-
pretation vis-a-vis counterfactual definiteness.
Uncertainty of Conjugate Variables
The first key area which proscribed, based on above,
is the simultaneous reality of conjugate variables. The
only interpretation which proposes the real definiteness
of both such variables in a pair is Bohm’s theory, and it
is counted as one of the key weaknesses of that theory.
This is for two reasons. Firstly, progressive experiments
have made it clearer and clearer that such a conjugate
indeterminacy isn’t to do with our ability to find out
both variables, but down to the real lack of coexistence
of them - the indeterminacy is built into the universe, as
per Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation giving a maximal
co-resolution of ~2 , rather than being due to our appara-
tus. The second, and possibly more important point is
that this indeterminacy seems key to how certain quan-
tum objects interact and behave - such as an electron
taking up all of its shell, rather than being solely a point
that we struggle determining the exact location of, in
order to allow Pauli exclusion to build the outer struc-
tures of atoms. While you could simply slide all of these
properties to Bohm’s quantum potential, eventually that
seems simply to make the potential more the ’real’ ob-
ject, and the point-like particle an effectively non-existent
marker used solely for the sake of our own comprehension
- bringing in uncertainty indeterminacy by the effective
6backdoor of the theory. This means, in all interpreta-
tions, as per experimental evidence, the uncertainty re-
lation between two conjugate variables, and the indeter-
minacy caused by this, must be included.
Indeterminacy of ’Counterfactual’ Options
Looking now slightly wider, we have to evaluate to
what extent we can preserve counterfactual definiteness
for those elements of a state that, prior to a point, were in
a superposition within the state, but, after measurement
occurred, no longer exist within it. Given the range of
possible options, from the looser ’simultaneous reality’ of
all options posited by relative state/’many worlds’ inter-
pretations, to the complete indefiniteness of collapse the-
ories, to the quietist ignorance advocated by the Copen-
hagen interpretation, we aren’t ever left with any truly
counterfactually definite options, but must find adequate
ground to consider just what happens to the ’lost’ parts
of states post-measurement.
An easy initial way to go about this might be by con-
sidering system energy and entropy. The Von Neumann
entropy is a quantum measure analogous to the classi-
cal Shannon entropy. As a way to consider information
lost during a collapse process, by deriving the relative
entropy between two states, it allows us to view the ef-
fective change during a measurement process. Given, in
any collapse-based interpretation, this relative entropy
actively counts as the information lost (as opposed to in
relative state interpretations where the creation of ’al-
ternate worlds’ allows this information to be preserved),
it seems far more informationally serendipitous to prefer
interpretations where measurement doesn’t cause infor-
mation loss. To that end, by using a theory whereby
states all have simultaneous existence, less information
is lost, and so we can become at least slightly more coun-
terfactually definite. It does this by positing, if not the
sole and definite existence of a counterfactual possibility,
at least the existence of multiple counterfactual options.
Counterfactual Semi-Definiteness
Based on this, linking to an Everettian perspective,
looking to preserve as much counterfactual definite-
ness as we can while still respecting experimental evi-
dence, we have stumbled upon this: counterfactual semi-
definiteness. Through this, while being unable to at-
tribute a single result to potential measurement as we
can do classically with counterfactual definiteness, we
are able to, for a finite number of possible states, de-
fine and determine the result that each of them would
bring, and weigh this up as per the Born rule, allow-
ing us not just to think in terms of possible worlds,
but carefully weighted possible-world-ontologies. This
returns some measure of common sense to the discus-
sion - as opposed to Copenhagen-style or collapse-style
interpretations, whereby counterfactual possible ontolo-
gies are either ignored or treated as non-existent respec-
tively, here we can discuss, evaluate and consider them.
This holds use not just for after the point at which a
different measure could be made, but before - as will be
seen below, possible options already have been shown to
be able to interfere to derive results in no way possible
classically, which are ontologically even more promising
than the simple idea of just one counterfactually definite
option.
Shifted Counterfactuality
Looking now at counterfactuality less as what could
be done by a person to a system, and more as, within
these systems, ways measurement could have collapsed
the state to in our world but didn’t, we can see a fair
bit of similarity, especially if we attribute counterfactual
semi-definiteness to all these possible options. Indeed,
prior to collapse, by the very nature of the density ma-
trix formulation created by Von Neumann [22], we can
see interactions between different modes representing dif-
ferent possibilities for the system to collapse into, which
would be impossible under a classical system. Such inter-
actions have been posited to do wondrous things, such as
observing counterfactually something without damaging
it, as per Elitzur and Vaidman’s ’Bomb Detector’ [23], or
communicating without sending anything between two
parties [24], as per Salih et al’s counterfactual communi-
cator [25–27] - things deemed impossible classically, and
which, without the evaluation of these semi-definite op-
tions, would never have been thought of.
All this shows the need for a more open viewpoint on
counterfactual options, or, even more broadly, metaphys-
ical elements of our ontologies, than is prohibited by the
traditional Copenhagen interpretation. These ideas were
only opened up nearly forty years after the Selvig con-
ference, by researchers such as Bell writing in Epistemo-
logical Letters [28]. The ability to put Einstein’s chal-
lenge to this quantum orthodoxy into a testable form,
even though it ended with the disproof of his ideal local-
hidden-variable viewpoint, led researchers to once again
plumb the more philosophical side of quantum mechan-
ics, long-neglected by followers of Heisenberg and Dirac
- and hopefully, either through counterfactuality specifi-
cally or through wider work in the field, will lead to the
next key advances.
CONCLUSION
Through this evaluation, looking initially at the logic of
Bell’s Theorem, and then the trilemma that it causes, we
7have been able to see just how necessary the lack of coun-
terfactual definiteness, one of the most peculiar aspects
of quantum mechanics, is to allow even basic quantum
phenomena to occur. Alongside that, we have then been
able to evaluate what the minimal amount of this loss
is so we can still maintain the theoretical underpinnings
of the experimental evidence we observe. Between these
two sides, the problem of loss of counterfactual definite-
ness has been presented and evaluated, with the conclu-
sion reached that, while Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation
prevents us from having the strong counterfactual defi-
niteness of classical mechanics, we can at least obtain a
form of counterfactual semi-definiteness. This definite-
ness of possible options available after a measurement
event, while in no way as solid as that forbidden by Ein-
stein, Podolsky and Rosen’s paradox and Bell’s Theorem,
allows us to start investigating the physical implementa-
tion of possible states in a way that, until Bell, had rarely
been done since the advent of quantum theory. Working
from this insight, the myriad of potential areas of de-
velopment in counterfactuality seems breathtaking, and
likely to underpin developments in quantum theory and
application for years to come.
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